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The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: 
Legal Challenges with Renewed Momentum
Pasha L. Hsieh, Singapore Management University School of Law
1. Introduction
The status of Taiwan has been one of the most intricate issues in both interna-
tional law and international relations arenas for the past decades. The Taiwan 
question is essentially an extension of the “two Chinas” problem, which cre-
ates a dilemma for international law in accommodating the de facto existence 
of Taiwan under the vague concept of the one-China policy. Taiwan’s govern-
ment, known offi cially as the Republic of China (ROC), was widely recog-
nized as the only legitimate Chinese government until the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly passed Resolution 2758 in 1971. This resolution replaced the 
ROC with its communist rival, the People’s Republic China (PRC) in the UN. 
After the deprivation of the UN seat had left Taiwan in a global legal vacuum, 
foreign states and international organizations have employed creative legal 
concepts in order to salvage the situation. In addition, from an international 
relations perspective, the Taiwan Strait, one of the most likely confl ict zones in 
the Asia-Pacifi c region, has been dubbed the “Balkan Peninsula of the East.” 
The ROC-PRC, or cross-strait, situation is further aggravated by Taiwan’s key 
geo-strategic location, which has caused sovereignty over the island to remain 
the most sensitive issue in China-United States relations. 
The Taiwan question and the so-called one-China policy must be discussed 
in tandem, given that they are closely intertwined in law and politics. This arti-
cle will analyze the one-China legal challenges involving cross-strait relations 
and how these challenges have evolved over time. To this end, Section II will 
fi rst provide an overview of the historical background of Beijing-Taipei rela-
tions. This article argues that the ROC on Taiwan never “ceased” to be a state 
following derecognition and the division of the nation of “old China” between 
two regimes, which possess separate statehoods. Facing this reality, both the 
ROC and the PRC have changed their previously once-rigid one-China poli-
cies and dealt pragmatically with cross-strait relations. 
Moreover, foreign states have also followed various “divided state” for-
mulas in the China case by recognizing the PRC as the de jure government of 
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China, but according de facto recognition to the ROC’s authority over Taiwan. 
Section III will then analyze the framework for cross-strait talks and resumed 
talks on economic cooperation under the leadership of China’s Hu Jintao and 
Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou. This section demonstrates that a fl exible interpreta-
tion of the one-China policy has led to a more constructive solution to the two 
sides’ 60-year political and ideological gap. Section IV will examine Taiwan’s 
participation in international organizations and the one-China obstacle it has 
encountered. The section will, in particular, analyze Taiwan’s recent participa-
tion as an observer in the World Health Assembly (WHA), marking the fi rst 
UN meeting the country has attended since it left the UN. Section V will con-
clude. 
2. Historical Background: The Origin of the Taiwan Question
The Taiwan question originates from the two Chinas dilemma. Cross-strait 
relations can be divided into three stages. The fi rst stage includes the period 
from 1895 to 1945, when cross-strait relations were “international relations” 
between China and Japan. The Republic of China, Asia’s fi rst constitutional re-
public, was founded by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang or KMT) 
after it overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1912. At the time of the ROC’s birth, 
Taiwan was not within China’s territorial scope, given that the previous Qing 
government ceded Taiwan “in perpetuity” to the Empire of Japan under the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895.1 
The second stage of cross-strait relations, from 1945-1949, was purely do-
mestic because both sides were under the jurisdiction of the ROC. During the 
Second World War, Chinese forces fought against Japanese invasion under 
the command of the highest leader of the ROC government, Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-Shek. To outline the terms of Japan’s surrender, the allied pow-
ers, including China, mandated that Taiwan, which “Japan has stolen from the 
1 Article 11 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki provides that “China cedes to Japan in per-
petuity and full sovereignty the following territories […] [including] the island of 
Formosa […] and [t]he Pescadores Group […].” It should be noted that the PRC and 
the ROC differ as to the legal status of the treaty. From the PRC’s perspective, the 
treaty is characterized as an “unequal treaty” – signed under coercion, inconsistent 
with jus cogens and, consequently, invalid from the beginning. Following this logic, 
China never lost sovereignty over Taiwan, but simply “resumed” exercise of sove-
reignty of the island after Japan’s surrender. The ROC did not challenge the validity 
of the treaty from 1985 to 1941, until its Declaration of War on Japan on Decem-
ber 9, 1941 denunciated all bilateral treaties between the two nations, including, of 
course, the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
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Chinese, […] shall be restored to the Republic of China.”2 This arrangement 
was unambiguously stated in the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and reconfi rmed 
in the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. Japan, in its Instrument of Surrender, ac-
cepted the provisions prescribed by allied powers in September 1945, ending 
the long-lasting war. One month later, ROC forces offi cially took over Taiwan3 
and restored Taiwanese residents’ Chinese nationality. Following the conclu-
sion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and the allied powers 
in 1951, Japan and the ROC signed the Treaty of Taipei. Under these treaties, 
Japan reiterated that it renounced its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.4 Con-
sequently, it is uncontested that from October 1945 to 1949, both Mainland 
China and Taiwan belonged to one nation: the ROC.
The Taiwan question did not occur as a major issue until 1949 when the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded the rival regime, the People’s Re-
public of China, led by Chairman Mao Zedong. The defeated ROC govern-
ment fl ed to Taiwan. From 1949 to the present, cross-strait relations entered 
the third stage of a vague legal nature – neither international nor domestic. 
Despite the PRC’s claim that it had “succeeded” the ROC, the ROC on Taiwan 
enjoyed worldwide recognition for decades as the only legitimate government 
of China, in both the United Nations and the diplomatic circle. From the 1950s 
onward, the Soviet Union’s attempts to remove the ROC from the UN were 
consistently blocked by the Washington-led alliance. Nonetheless, the situ-
ation changed in the 1960s, as many pro-Beijing, newly-independent states 
were admitted into the UN and altered the dynamic of the Western-dominated 
2 Stated in the Cairo Declaration. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration 
were jointly issued by the United States (Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry 
S. Truman, respectively), the United Kingdom (Prime Minister Winston Churchill) 
and the ROC (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek). Section Eight of the Potsdam De-
claration, which reconfi rmed the Cairo Declaration, provides that “[t]he terms of the 
Cairo Declaration shall be carried out […].” 
3 Japanese forces in Taiwan surrendered to the representative of Chiang on October 
25, 1945. 
4 Neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to attend the San Francisco Peace Con-
ference, due to disagreement between the US and the UK over China’s representa-
tion, as the former recognized the ROC, while the latter had switched recognition to 
the PRC. According to Article 2 of the Treaty of Taipei of 1952, “[i]t is recognised 
that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San 
Francisco on 8 September 1951 […], Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim 
to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands 
and the Paracel Islands.” 
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General Assembly.5 In 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Albania-pro-
posed Resolution 2758:
[…] Decides to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and 
to recognize the representatives of its government as the only legitimate 
representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the 
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully 
occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.6 
(emphasis added)
This resolution expelled the ROC, one of the UN’s founding members, from 
the UN and forever changed the destiny of Taiwan. In less than a year, the ROC 
was compelled to leave almost all UN-affi liated agencies. The legal reason for 
this is simple. Resolution 2758 transferred the China seat to the PRC, leaving 
no room for the ROC. Even worse, the Nixon administration decided to sever 
relations with the ROC and recognize the PRC in 1979. The fact that most 
states followed the US’s decision makes Taiwan the most renowned example 
of an unrecognized state or an entity sui generis. As of 2009, the ROC on 
Taiwan maintains diplomatic ties with only 23 countries in the world, most of 
which are in Africa and Latin America, and none are major.7 The absence of 
recognition, which underpins legal challenges to the Taiwan question, further 
complicates cross-strait relations vis-à-vis the international community. 
3. One China, Different Interpretations
Neither UN Resolution 2758 nor the ROC’s loss of recognition from major 
states resolved the Taiwan question. These decisions clarifi ed that the PRC 
is now the legitimate government of China, but they left it ambiguous as to 
whether Taiwan is part of the “China” that the PRC claims to represent. The 
Taiwan question is, in fact and in law, intertwined with the one-China policy. 
5 See Kirgis 1993, p. 179.
6 Resolution on Representation on China, United Nations General Assembly, Oct. 25, 
1971, G.A. Res. 2758, 26 GAOR Supp. 29 (A/8429), p. 2.
7 These countries include: Europe (Vatican City); Africa (Burkina Faso, Gambia, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Swaziland); Pacifi c (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu); Latin America (Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vi). Information of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=11624&CtNode=1426&mp=1 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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There are three major theories across the political spectrum that I will discuss 
in order. 
According to Beijing’s one-China principle, the PRC succeeded the ROC as 
the sole government of China.8 Put simply, the ROC was gone and Taiwan is 
now part of the PRC. Thus, Taiwan, deemed a “renegade province” occupied 
by illegal forces, has absolutely no international legal personality. This posi-
tion is unfounded. First of all, the ROC, since its founding in 1912, has never 
ceased to be a state. Neither the Japanese occupation nor the creation of the 
PRC extinguished the ROC’s statehood for even a day. The ROC has consist-
ently met the statehood criteria under the Montevideo Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, given that the nation possesses a permanent population, a 
defi ned territory, and a functioning government with the capacity to enter into 
foreign relations.9 These parameters of the ROC may have changed over time, 
but they have never disappeared. With respect to the last “capacity” criterion, 
it may be argued that, as Taiwan’s diplomatic relations are limited, the country 
lacks such capacity. Yet, this argument does not stand, because the ROC’s dip-
lomatic obstacle is due to the PRC’s pressure over foreign states, which has led 
to the restriction of the ROC’s foreign relations capacity. 
Secondly, some may contend that the mere existence of statehood criteria 
set forth under the Montevideo Convention is irrelevant in the Taiwan case, be-
cause its failure to seriously assert its statehood precludes its characterization 
as a state.10 This position ignores the fi ne difference between the two territorial 
concepts, Taiwan and the ROC. Given that the ROC’s de facto jurisdiction 
extends only to Taiwan, these two political concepts have largely been merged 
in both international law and political discourse. However, it should be noted 
that, from a precise legal perspective, the province of Taiwan is part of the 
ROC, which has never failed to assert its statehood. 
Thirdly, Beijing’s one-China version, stating that Taiwan is part of the PRC, 
has never been accepted by foreign states. While foreign governments recog-
nize the PRC as the legal government of China, they almost uniformly disagree 
with the PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan. That is why, in their respective 
8 For the PRC’s position on Taiwan, see two white papers issued by the Taiwan Affairs 
Offi ce of the State Council: The Taiwan Question and Reunifi cation of China (1993) 
and The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000).
9 For the past 60 years, the ROC on Taiwan has had a standing population of 23 mil-
lion living on Taiwan and its outlying islands. The government has also functioned 
independently of the PRC. 
10 For example Crawford 2006, p. 219 (“[…] Taiwan is not a state because it still has 
not unequivocally asserted its separation from China and is not recognized as State 
distinct from China.”).
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joint communiqué with the PRC, the US and the UK simply “acknowledge,” 
Canada “takes note of,” and Japan “understands and respects” the PRC’s posi-
tion that Taiwan is part of China.11 These carefully chosen terms, used instead 
of the word, “recognize,” as well as negotiations history, directly refute the 
RPC’s claim of an “international consensus” that Taiwan is an inalienable part 
of China. 
Finally, these foreign countries’ positions also imply that the ROC’s loss of 
recognition does not extinguish its statehood. Their positions are also consist-
ent with the declaratory theory. Based upon this prevailing view of recognition, 
diplomatic recognition simply functions as the acknowledgement of a state, 
and no states can “by their independent judgment establish any competence 
of other states.”12 Hence, the ROC’s existence is simply a fact; its statehood is 
by no means undermined by its lack of universal recognition. In other words, 
acceptance of the claim that the ROC lost its statehood by the loss of the UN 
seat or recognition inevitably leads to an ironical conclusion that the PRC did 
not “constitute” a state until the 1970s.
The second theory claims that Taiwan’s legal status has yet to be determined. 
According to this theory, neither the San Francisco Peace Treaty nor the sub-
sequent Treaty of Taipei determine the sovereignty of Taiwan, because Japan, 
in these treaties, unilaterally relinquished its sovereign claim over Taiwan, but 
was silent as to which country the right would be transferred.13 Taiwan’s status 
is, thus, undetermined. Moreover, since the ROC never gained title to Taiwan 
from these treaties, the PRC could not succeed the title from the ROC. As 
Taiwan’s “title vests in no state of the world,” its future should be determined 
by a plebiscite according to the self-determination principle.14 Commentators 
continue to argue that although Taiwan was under illegal “military occupation” 
of Chiang’s forces for decades, the democratic process of Taiwan since the 
1980s has transformed Taiwan’s undetermined status to an independent, but 
11 See US-PRC Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
(1979), UK-PRC Joint Communiqué Concerning Upgraded Diplomatic Relations 
(1972), Canada-PRC Joint Communiqué Concerning the Establishment of Diploma-
tic Relations (1970), Japan-PRC Joint Communiqué (1972); see also Green 1972, 
pp. 128-129 (“Our position, […] which was made clear to Chinese from the start of 
the negotiations, is that the Canadian Government does nothing appropriate either 
to endorse or to challenge the Chinese government’s position on the status of Tai-
wan.”). 
12 Brownlie 2003, p. 88.
13 For example Chen / Reisman 1972, pp. 641-47; Crawford 2006, p. 208.
14 Chen / Reisman, p. 654.
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yet to be complete, state.15 This theory is plausible, but it contains several logi-
cal fl aws. First, the meaning of treaties can be determined by the golden rule of 
interpretation, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. When the terms 
of treaties are ambiguous, the interpretations of such treaties can resort to sup-
plementary means, including “preparatory work” and “circumstances of [their] 
conclusion.”16 When Japan signed these two treaties, the ROC government had 
exercised effective jurisdiction over Taiwan. This fact was well known to, and 
never challenged by, Japan and the international community. Even assuming 
that the San Francisco Peace Treaty fails to decide Taiwan’s status,17 it cannot 
be ignored that Japan and the ROC signed the Treaty of Taipei in Taiwan in 
just the following year. The prime purpose of that treaty was to reestablish 
diplomatic relations between the two nations. It would be unconceivable that 
the ROC would agree to the treaty if Japan intentionally left Taiwan’s status 
unresolved. These situations surrounding the conclusion of the treaties render 
this theory unconvincing. 
Secondly, this theory equates the “plebiscite” with Taiwan’s democratic 
process, including four direct presidential elections from 1996 to 200818 and 
argues that Taiwan has achieved independent status. The problem with this 
contention is that the ROC’s presidential elections can be interpreted as a self-
determination plebiscite, given that the elections were conducted to elect ROC 
presidents and not to vote for independence. Even assuming that the elections 
functioned as the plebiscite, the theory fails to provide a clear answer regard-
ing at what point the new state of Taiwan was born. 
The third, and more sensible, theory categorizing the status of Taiwan and 
cross-strait relations is the divided state theory. China is currently divided be-
tween the PRC and ROC. Since 1949, the PRC on the Mainland and the ROC 
on Taiwan have co-existed under the “de jure roof of China.” Both govern-
15 Chen 2008, pp. 493-496.
16 See Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 
17 See also Roger C.S. Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 506 (C.A.D.C. 2009) (“But 
for many years, [...] since the signing the [San Francisco Treaty] itself […], the 
Executive has gone out of its way to avoid making that determination, creating an 
information defi cit for determining the status of the people on Taiwan.”); Sir An-
thony Eden’s Statement, 536 HC Deb col 159 (wa), Feb. 4, 1955 (“The Peace Treaty 
[…] did not […] transfer [Taiwan] to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People’s 
Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. [Taiwan is], therefore, in 
the view of Her Majesty’s Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which 
is uncertain or undetermined.”). 
18 The fi rst direct presidential election for the 9th term ROC president took place in 
1996. Ma Ying-jeou (KMT Candidate) won the most recent election and took offi ce 
as the 12th term ROC president in 2008.
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ments have shared sovereignty of the “old China,” but neither side exercised 
jurisdiction over the other. For the past 60 years, both sides have functioned 
as independent states with distinct international legal personalities. As I will 
argue, the laws of the ROC and the PRC have gradually overcome the legal 
challenges to the one-China principle by reaching a divided state consensus, 
which has also been supported by the judicial practice of foreign states. 
3.1 Law of Taiwan, Republic of China
At the end of World War II, the ROC National Assembly, then based in Nanjing, 
passed the ROC Constitution in 1947. The outbreak of the civil war prompted 
the National Assembly to enact the Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
Period of Communist Rebellion in the following year. The goal of the Provi-
sions was to extend the president’s power by freezing citizens’ constitutional 
rights. This was intended to enable the government to more effectively combat 
opposing Communist forces. As the name suggests, the Provisions show that 
the ROC regarded members of the PRC regime as illegitimate Communist 
rebels, with no legal status whatsoever under domestic law. 
Nonetheless, throughout time, the Provisions were under heavy criticism 
for two reasons. First, the existence of the PRC on mainland China is a reality 
that cannot be denied. The Provisions, which treated the PRC as illegal, left no 
room for the two rival governments to negotiate. From a more pragmatic per-
spective, the Provisions prevented any possibility of a legal basis for govern-
ing relations between the two sides. For instance, there was no constitutional 
basis for penalizing illegal immigrants from Mainland China to Taiwan, given 
that, technically, Mainland residents are entitled to the right to free movement 
under the ROC Constitution. Second, the Provisions hindered the normal con-
stitutional order in Taiwan, as the ruling party, Kuomintang, had relied on the 
Provisions as an excuse to decline to hold universal elections for members of 
the National Assembly and presidents. 
Taiwan took an important step in 1991, when the National Assembly abol-
ished the Provisions and passed Additional Articles to the Constitution. The 
amendments authorize the government to enact laws to govern cross-strait 
relations and, more profoundly, mandate that, prior to “national reunifi ca-
tion,” elections for new National Assembly members will take place only in 
the ROC’s “free area.”19 A reasonable interpretation of this term signifi es the 
landslide change of the legal attitude towards the PRC. The ROC recognizes 
19 Articles 1 and 10, The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Chi-
na (1991). The Additional Articles have been amended seven times and the current 
version was promulgated in 2005.
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explicitly that the “one China” (that is the ROC) is comprised of two areas: 
the free area under the government’s control and the rest of the ROC (Main-
land China), to which the ROC’s jurisdiction does not extend. The 1992 Act 
Government Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland 
Area (Cross-Strait Statute) further vindicates this view by distinguishing the 
“Taiwan Area” from the “Mainland Area.”20 The Cross-Strait Statute, which 
lays the foundation of Taiwan’s China policy, provides an overall framework 
for administrative, civil and criminal matters arising from cross-strait matters. 
From a legal perspective, the ROC government, regardless of the ruling po-
litical parties, has followed the “one ROC, two areas” formula based on the 
divided state theory. 
The one-China problem has also provoked judicial interpretations. In 1993, 
the ROC Constitutional Court was asked to defi ne the scope of the ROC ter-
ritory, which, according to the Constitution, “shall be within its existing legal 
boundaries.”21 The Court avoided addressing this issue by fi nding that the is-
sue is beyond judicial review based on the political question doctrine. The 
Court, nonetheless, was again asked a different question of a similar nature. 
Congress (Legislative Yuan) members requested that the Court interprets what 
categories of “international agreements” should be sent to the Legislative Yuan 
for deliberation. Finding it diffi cult to bypass this issue, the Court in its obiter 
dictum explained that because cross-strait agreements are not within the scope 
of international agreements this interpretation shall not apply to such agree-
ments.22 Logically speaking, if cross-strait agreements are not considered to be 
international, they must, therefore, be domestic. A more sound interpretation of 
these agreements should be referred to the Constitutional Court of Germany’s 
decision, which affi rmed the constitutionality of the Basic Treaty concluded 
between the two Germanys. In the decision, the Court found that the Basic 
Treaty “is a treaty under international law” and governs “inter se relations” 
of Germany.23 Comparable to the German case, cross-strait agreements also 
20 Articles 1 and 2, respectively, of the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area defi ne “Taiwan Area” as “Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen, Matsu, and any other area under the effective control of the Government” 
and “Mainland Area” as “the territory of the Republic of China outside the Taiwan 
Area.”
21 Interpretation No. 328, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judicial Yuan (1993).
22 Interpretation No. 329, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judicial Yuan (1994).
23 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, Constitutionality of the Basic Treaty 
(1973).
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regulate the two Chinas’ “special state-to-state relationship”24 under the ROC’s 
one-China framework. 
3.2 Law of People’s Republic of China
The PRC’s one-China policy was once as rigid as the ROC’s, albeit in a dia-
metrically opposing direction. The preamble to the PRC Constitution provides 
that “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China” 
and stresses the “lofty duty” to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Based on 
the PRC’s interpretation, “one China” refers to the PRC, and Taiwan, as part 
of the PRC, is currently occupied by unlawful forces. Strictly speaking, these 
terms in the preamble confl ict with the divided state theory because, in the 
PRC view, the ROC is simply a historic term and possesses no statehood un-
der international law. However, based on the gradual evolvement of the legal 
development and judicial practice, the PRC’s attitude towards the “one China 
equals the PRC” formula has fundamentally, albeit implicitly, changed. The 
major political impetus which prompted the change included two successive 
victories in Taiwan’s presidential elections by the pro-independence Demo-
cratic Progress Party (DPP). The PRC came to realize that its one-China pol-
icy, which provides no equal status to its counterpart in Taiwan, has fueled the 
hostile attitude of the Taiwanese towards China and indirectly aided the DPP’s 
election campaigns. From a macro policy perspective, the PRC then altered its 
strategy from “promoting reunifi cation” to defensive “anti-independence” ef-
forts. This change is refl ected in its laws concerning Taiwan. 
The most signifi cant statute on Taiwan is the Anti-Cessation Law that the 
PRC National People’s Congress passed in 2005. The purpose of the law is to 
authorize the government to take measures against Taiwan under particular cir-
cumstances. The passage of the law immediately resulted in large protests on 
the Taiwan side. However, the law, in fact, signifi es a signifi cant change of the 
PRC’s perception of the Taiwan issue: for the fi rst time, the PRC implicitly rec-
ognizes the current status of a divided China. Several aspects are noteworthy. 
First, the goal of the Anti-Cessation Law is to deter Taiwan independence and 
underline certain situations in which the government shall adopt “non-peace-
ful means and other necessary measures.”25 Nonetheless, the legal authority 
24 In an interview with Deutsche Welle Radio in 1999, former President Lee Teng-hui 
explained that the 1991 constitutional amendments limit the ROC’s constitutional 
effects on Taiwan and recognize the legitimacy of the PRC on the mainland. He 
further characterizes “cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least 
a special state-to-state relationship.” Interview available at http://www.taiwandc.
org/nws-9926.htm. The PRC was severely infuriated by Lee’s “two-state theory.”
25 These situations were listed in Article 8 of the Anti-Cessation Act, including: “In the 
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under the law is simply redundant if the Taiwan issue is only a domestic one, 
as the PRC once asserted, because the prohibition of the use of force under 
international law would be unlikely to preclude the PRC from using force in 
its internal affairs. 
Secondly, Article 2 of the law provides that “both the mainland and Taiwan 
belong to one China.” This is important language because the word “China” has 
been carefully chosen, rather than the “PRC,” as Beijing had consistently used. 
This implies that China includes not only the PRC but also Taiwan. Thirdly, 
based on Article 5, “[a]fter the country is reunifi ed,” Taiwan may “enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy.” This provision means that Taiwan will follow the destiny 
of Hong Kong and Macau as a “special administrative region”26 under Deng 
Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” framework. A more important aspect of 
this provision is to acknowledge the reality that the current status of China is 
that of “not-yet-reunifi ed.” Finally, Article 7 further calls for cross-strait talks 
based on “equal footing.” This position largely evolved from the PRC’s prior 
stance that the Beijing-Taipei relationship is one of a central government to-
wards a local government. In sum, based on the analyses above, although the 
Anti-Cessation Law incurred negative political ramifi cations towards cross-
strait relations, the legal signifi cance ironically aligns the PRC’s one-China 
policy with the ROC’s policy. 
The PRC’s judicial practice also affi rms this pragmatic approach and ac-
knowledges the ROC’s de facto authority over Taiwan. For instance, in 1998 
and 2009, respectively, the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court issued judicial in-
terpretations which stipulate that, once recognized by Chinese courts, Taiwan-
ese courts’ civil verdicts will be given the same validity in China as Chinese 
judicial decisions.27 This approach further infl uences the post-takeover Hong 
Kong court, which also decided to recognize a Taiwanese court’s bankruptcy 
order. The court recognized that although Taiwan is “under the de jure sover-
eignty of the PRC.”28 As the court reasoned, to recognize orders by Taiwanese 
event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name 
or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major 
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities 
for a peaceful reunifi cation should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ 
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.”
26 Article 31 of the PRC Constitution provides that “[t]he state may establish special 
administrative regions when necessary.”
27 See Xinhua News Agency May 14, 2009.
28 Chen Li Hung v. Ting Leu Miao, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R. 9, 21 (C.F.A.).
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courts is not only “necessary as a matter of common sense and justice,” but 
also benefi cial to the movement toward national reunifi cation.29 
The change of the interpretation of its one-China policy demonstrates the 
new generation of PRC leaders’ more pragmatic approach. Both the PRC and 
ROC governments have gradually shifted from the two ends of the political 
spectrum towards the middle, thereby bridging the legal gap between their 
one-China policies. Both Beijing and Taipei concede that the de facto situation 
of China is divided, particularly given that both recognized the importance of 
dealing with cross-strait matters “before” reunifi cation. However, the key legal 
difference between the two sides, concerning the de jure status of the divided 
China, remains. Another signifi cant divergence relates to the ultimate future of 
China. For the PRC, reunifi cation is the option, whereas it is only an option 
for Taiwan. 
3.3 Laws of Foreign States
Foreign states also faced the Taiwan question after they switched recognition to 
the PRC. Their practice can be characterized as the “one China, different inter-
pretations” policy, which, in essence, applies the divided state theory to China. 
Foreign states offi cially conceded to Beijing’s one-China policy in diplomatic 
settings, but recognized the ROC’s authority both in fact and in law. This prac-
tice is not only refl ected in their respective governments’ joint communiqués 
with the PRC, as mentioned above, but also in their judicial practices. The 
prime reason for this approach is pragmatism. The PRC in fact has no control 
over Taiwan and, hence, a framework must be developed to deal with foreign 
affairs concerning Taiwan. This approach also delicately overcomes the legal 
challenges caused by the switch of recognition to the PRC.
The United States is the most renowned example. US administrations have 
consistently based their China policies on three US-PRC communiqués and 
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).30 US President Barack Obama reiterated this 
position in his state visit to China in 2009.31 Yet, it is noteworthy that the US 
version of the one-China policy is different from that of the PRC. As the most 
recent US-China Joint Statement indicates, the US government “follows its one 
29 Id. at 21 & 25.
30 The three communiqués include the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), the Joint Com-
muniqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1979) and the 817 Com-
muniqués. The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. The TRA 
provides that “[t]he absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect 
the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan.” 22 U.S.C. § 
3303 (2000).
31 The White House, Offi ce of the Press Secretary November 17, 2009a.
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China policy.”32 The key difference between the stances of the PRC and the 
US is that the latter has never recognized the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan.33 
Moreover, the US court has clearly pointed out that US-China diplomatic ties 
cannot be interpreted as the “acceptance of one another’s territorial claim.”34 
In fact, while the three joint communiqués normalized US-PRC relations, the 
TRA, passed by the Congress, was to mandate that the US government and 
courts regard Taiwan “as if derecognition has not occurred.”35 According to 
the TRA, the US government not only established the de facto embassy – the 
American Institute in Taiwan – to maintain “non-offi cial” relations with Tai-
wan, but the US courts have also consistently accorded Taiwan state status 
under the Act of State Doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.36 
Additionally, the TRA prevents the PRC from succeeding the ROC’s embassy 
property, and the ROC-US Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
continues to be effective.37 The US’s approach to the one-China policy, as the 
court pointed out, reaffi rms the US-Taiwan “quasi government relations” and 
indicates the US’s “de facto recognition of Taiwan.”38
Other countries also share the US approach, even in the absence of statutes 
such as the TRA. For example, the United Kingdom, under its Foreign Cor-
32 The White House, Offi ce of the Press Secretary November 17, 2009b (emphasis 
added). The Taiwan Relations Act was deliberately removed from the written Joint 
Statement. The PRC does not “recognize” the TRA, claiming that the provisions of 
the TRA (in particular, those concerning arms sales to Taiwan) directly contravene 
the US’s commitments of the one-China principle under the three joint communi-
qués. 
33 The Chairman of the American Institute in Taipei explained to Taiwan President Ma 
Ying-jeou that the United States “has never taken a position on the political status 
of Taiwan.” See http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/1/200911/1125_351_1449730.shtml 
(Nov. 25, 2009, in Chinese).
34 Wong v. Ilchert, 998 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1993).
35 Dupont Circle Citizens Ass’n. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 530 A.2d 1163, 
1170 (D.C. 1987).
36 22 U.S.C. § 3305 (2000); Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. 
Affairs, 855 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel 
Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Chu v. Taiwan Tobacco & Wine Monopoly 
Bureau, 30 F.3d 139 (1994).
37 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(3)(A) (2000). The PRC is therefore able to keep its embassy 
property, known as “Twin Oaks” that the country had purchased in 1947; N.Y. Chi-
nese T.V. Programs v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 841, 847, 853–54 (D.N.J 
1996).
38 Chang v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
72 DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE
PASHA L. HSIEH
poration Act, recognizes Taiwanese law as the law of a recognized state.39 In 
addition, the British court ruled that Taiwan and China should be deemed sepa-
rate countries, given their different “political boundaries”; hence, it was imper-
missible for the International Amateur Athletic Federation to exclude Taiwan 
based on its charter’s “one member for each country” provision.40 Similarly, 
the Swiss court decided to grant Taiwan judicial assistance, ruling that the lack 
of bilateral diplomatic ties should not bar such assistance.41 
The French court, which is even more unambiguous, dismissed the PRC’s 
intermediary appeal and held that, as “the Republic of China […] is a Chi-
nese state (Etat Chinois),” the absence of recognition does not hinder its legal 
standing to defend the right of its former embassy property.42 Moreover, the 
German, Italian, and US courts have adamantly rejected the claim that the 
Warsaw Convention, to which the PRC is a party, should bind Taiwan, despite 
the PRC’s declaration that the convention “shall of course apply to the entire 
Chinese territory including Taiwan.”43 The Canadian courts went even further. 
The court in Nova Scotia specifi cally recognized Taiwan as a “fl ag state” under 
the Law of the Seas and decided that Taiwan possesses exclusive jurisdiction 
over Taiwanese nationals in high seas.44 In a subsequent case, the Quebec court 
upheld Taiwan’s sovereignty immunity claim. The court found that Taiwan 
meets all statehood criteria under the Montevideo Convention and that the Ca-
nadian government, despite its one-China policy, recognizes Taiwan’s “politi-
cal independence” by its offi cial dealings with Taiwan.45 
These cases support the author’s assertion that foreign states have followed 
their own “one China, different interpretations” approaches. These states never 
agreed to the PRC’s one-China version regarding Taiwan’s status. Rather, they 
have applied the divided state formula to cross-strait relations by recognizing 
39 See Crawford 2006, pp. 202-203.
40 Reel v. Holder, [1981] 3 All E.R. 321, 321-25.
41 See generally Henzelin 2005.
42 The property is located in Taiti (French Polynesia). La République De Chine, 2éme 
Chambre – Section B, Cour D’Appel De Paris, 07/02874 (Oct. 16, 2008), para. 3, p. 
7.
43 Landgericht Mönchengladbach (9 0 58/87) (Feb. 24, 1988), 1988 TRANSR 283; 
Fratelli v. Thai Airways, Alitalia, Tribunale di Naples, 23. 4. 1983 n. 2850, (1889) 
AIR L. 213; Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 
1145–47 (9th Cir. 1999).
44 Romania v. Cheng [1997] N.S.R.2d 13, 45 (Can.), reprinted in Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law and Affairs 15, pp. 111-140 (1996-97).
45 Parent v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] R.J.Q. 1330; see also Elias 2004. 
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the PRC as the government of China, but continuing to accord de facto recog-
nition of the ROC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. 
4. Cross-Strait Talks and Recent Developments
As discussed above, both Beijing and Taipei have adopted more fl exible inter-
pretations of their one-China policies. Although the PRC and the ROC never 
offi cially recognized each other, as the two Germanys did during the Ostpolitik 
era in the 1970s, the two Chinese regimes have at least come to an era of “non-
denial” of each other’s de facto existence in bilateral relations, thereby leaving 
room for negotiations with their counterpart. 
From a legal perspective, to either the PRC or the ROC, the other side of the 
Taiwan Strait is neither a completely foreign state nor a purely domestic terri-
tory. Consequently, both sides established specifi c agencies to deal with cross-
strait affairs. These agencies are China’s Taiwan Affairs Offi ce under the State 
Council and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council under the Executive Yuan.46 
However, because government-to-government negotiations would inevitably 
create an impression of offi cial recognition of each other, both China and Tai-
wan respectively created so-called “white glove,” semi-offi cial organizations 
– namely, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and 
the Strait Exchange Foundations (SEF) – to deal with cross-strait affairs. The 
fi rst ARATS-SEF talk took place in Singapore in 1993 and concluded with 
four agreements on notarized letters, registered mail and basic frameworks for 
cross-strait talks and exchanges.47 
4.1 Cross-Strait Economic Integration
However, due to the pro-independence stances of prior Taiwan presidents, the 
ARATS-SEF meetings were suspended until KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou 
came into offi ce in 2008. Ma’s China-friendly policy, based on his acquies-
cence to the 1992 consensus of “one China with different interpretations,”48 
46 As Chinese government agencies are under the control of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce also serves as the head of the CCP 
Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Offi ce. 
47 Note that the fi rst “unoffi cial” talk was held by the Red Cross Societies of Taiwan 
and China in 1990. Both societies concluded the Kinmen Agreement on the expatria-
tion of illegal immigrants and criminal suspects. 
48 The alleged “consensus” results from correspondences between the ARATS and the 
SEF on the one-China principle. The PRC has consistently insisted on the consensus 
as the precondition to resume cross-strait talks. 
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escalated cross-strait exchanges. In just one year, three ARATS-SEF meetings 
were held, at which various agreements that make regular, direct air and sea 
transport possible were fi nalized.49 The two sides also signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on fi nancial cooperation to open each other’s fi nancial mar-
kets.50 Currently, Beijing and Taipei are even negotiating a free trade agree-
ment (FTA), usually referred to as the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA), to further liberalize trade barriers.51 The ECFA will re-
lax Taiwan’s WTO-inconsistent restrictions on Chinese products and enable 
Taiwanese industries to further expand their operation in China. The ECFA, 
therefore, will be a landmark agreement that makes two political rivals “nor-
mal trading partners.”
These recent developments on cross-strait affairs are due to the fact that 
cross-strait economic integration proved to be inevitable. China’s same lan-
guage and lower-labor-cost market provides an attractive platform for Taiwan-
ese factories. In fact, from a global trade perspective, China and Taiwan are 
partners rather than competitors, given that industries from both sides are usu-
ally compatible and interdependent. The newly coined “Chiwan” phenomenon 
actually refers to the competitiveness of products that are “made by Taiwan but 
made in China.” 
The statistics show that the total cross-strait trade volume skyrocketed from 
$5 billion USD in 1990 to $105 billion in 2008.52 The share of trade with 
China accounts for 21 per cent of Taiwan’s total trade and, moreover, Taiwan 
has become the 7th largest source of China’s foreign direct investment. 53 The 
“no haste, be patient” policy that Taiwan adopted in 1996 in an attempt to 
curb the “China investment fever” largely failed, because the policy forced 
Taiwanese companies to go underground by investing in China through their 
foreign shell companies. The Taiwan government was unable to oversee the 
49 For instance, previous cross-strait charter fl ights were required to make a stopover 
in a “third place,” usually Hong Kong or Macau. These ARTS-SEF meetings, also 
referred to as “Chiang-Chen talks,” took place in July 2008 (Beijing), November 
2008 (Nanjing) and April 2009 (Taipei). For information on agreements concluded 
at the meetings, see http://www.mac.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=5891&mp=3.
50 The China Post November 17, 2009. This MOU also marks the fi rst document 
signed by “offi cial” government agencies (fi nancial supervisory bodies) of China 
and Taiwan. 
51 Introduction to the ECFA, see http://www.ecfa.org.tw/intro.php (in Chinese). 
52 Table 6: Estimated Total Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China (1987-2009), 
Mainland Affairs Council.
53 Table 8: The Shares of Cross-Strait Trade in Taiwan Total Foreign Trade (1984-
2009) & Table 30: Mainland China Realized Foreign Direct Investment by Country 
(Area) (2006-2009), Mainland Affairs Council. 
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cash fl ow of these companies and, therefore, lost tax revenues. Additionally, 
because of Taiwan’s restrictions on investments in China, both foreign and 
local enterprises gradually shifted their operations to China and Southeast 
Asia (for example Vietnam and the Philippines). This situation is expected 
to be aggravated by the FTA between China and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (China-ASEAN FTA), to be completed in 2010, because 
China-made products will enjoy zero-tariff treatment in the ASEAN market 
and vice-versa.54 These negative consequences and pressures from domestic 
industries prompted Taiwan’s new government to liberalize trade with China 
in an attempt to assist local companies in gaining entry to the Chinese market, 
while maintaining their headquarters and R&D operations in Taiwan. 
These economic developments have salient legal and political implica-
tions. First, in cross-strait economic talks, both Beijing and Taipei have pur-
sued “strategic ambiguity” regarding the one-China principle, similar to their 
pragmatic approaches toward legal developments. The two governments have 
avoided making sovereign disputes an obstacle to economic cooperation. This 
can be demonstrated in some technical matters. For example, on agreements 
concluded between the two sides, the “year” section at the bottom of these 
agreements is intentionally left blank. The reason for this is that offi cial Tai-
wanese documents are dated according to the ROC Year (1912 as the fi rst year 
of the ROC), which Beijing fi nds sensitive. Another example is that it became 
customary for government offi cials to attend ARATS-SEF meetings as “con-
sultants,” thus striking a delicate balance between effi ciency and keeping the 
meetings unoffi cial in nature. 
Secondly, international rules play an increasingly important role in cross-
strait matters. In this regard, China’s position on the cross-strait FTA, ECFA, 
is signifi cant. Although both China and Taiwan acceded to the WTO, China 
was reluctant to see Taiwan as an equal member and insisted that cross-strait 
trade matters, as domestic affairs, should be dealt with only on a bilateral basis. 
Nonetheless, the recent discourse of the Chinese leadership shifted this view 
when they agreed with their Taiwanese counterparts that the ECFA should be 
concluded under WTO rules.55 The shift of the PRC’s position represents an 
implied compromise between the two governments. On the Taiwan side, the 
Congress will be unlikely to agree to the ECFA if it does not indicate “equal 
status” between the two sides under international norms. From the Chinese 
perspective, China can refer to the example of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)56 and unilaterally explain 
54 See Weichen October 22, 2009.
55 Deming November 13, 2009.
56 The Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA was signed in 1993. A similar “arrangement” 
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that the ECFA, similar to the CEPA, can be concluded under the WTO frame-
work and does not contravene the one-China principle. The Chinese leadership 
was also well aware that the ECFA will accelerate cross-strait economic ties, 
which will provide an essential impetus for future, if possible, political integra-
tion. Therefore, based on these considerations, both sides came to a consensus 
under which cross-strait economic relations will be governed by WTO norms. 
4.2 Taiwan’s International Space
The practice of leaving the one-China ambiguous with fl exible interpretations 
does not automatically apply to political affairs involving Taiwan’s status in 
the international arena. In other words, the warming of Beijing-Taipei eco-
nomic ties does not necessarily overcome the foreseeable one-China bottle-
neck of cross-strait talks concerning Taiwan’s international space. The new 
“fl exible policy” that Taiwan’s President Ma advocates departs from that of 
former President Chen Shui-bian, who aimed at getting Beijing’s diplomatic 
allies to defect towards Taipei at any cost.57 Chen’s policy, notoriously known 
as the “dollar policy,” not only entrenched corruption in small states, but also 
caused a severe backlash from China and undermined US-Taiwan relations. 
To seek a diplomatic truce, Ma intends to rectify the zero-sum diplomatic 
problem by improving relations with China while increasing Taiwan’s interna-
tional space. For Taiwan, diplomacy is an extension of the cross-strait policy. 
Recent economic talks and the ECFA, thus, fall within Ma’s agenda. In fact, 
due to the China factor, Taiwan’s FTA efforts have had little progress. Despite 
its economic power, Taiwan has essentially been excluded from regional inte-
gration in Asia. As of 2009, Taiwan concluded FTAs with its fi ve Latin Ameri-
can allies,58 but their bilateral trade volume accounts for only 0.18 per cent of 
Taiwan’s total foreign trade.59 In the author’s view, the ECFA is envisaged as 
(instead of “agreement,” which usually refers to documents signed between two 
sovereigns) was signed between China and Macau. Introduction to the CEPA, see 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/. To avoid being “downgraded” to the status of 
Hong Kong, Taiwanese offi cials have insisted on using the word “agreement” to 
refer to the ECFA and that the two sides should use their offi cial titles under the 
WTO, namely, China and Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).
57 The China Post November 11, 2008.
58 Taiwan concluded FTAs with Panama (effective in 2004), Guatemala (effective in 
2006), Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras (effective in 2008), Free Trade Agree-
ment, Central America FTA Production Center, http://www.centralamericaproduct.
org/eng/site_content.php?site_content_sn=106 (last visited November 20, 2009).
59 The China Times October 16, 2009.
7784 (2009) 3
THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND THE ONE-CHINA POLICY
the key to the FTA door. Taiwan expects that FTA talks with its major trading 
partners – in particular, the US, Japan and Singapore – will accelerate if they 
observe that the “chilling effect” of the China factor is diminishing.60 This ap-
proach will also impose a new one-China test for Beijing. If China decides to 
obstruct Taiwan’s FTA efforts, as it did previously, it will inevitably undermine 
the mutual trust that supports recent economic cooperation. 
The one-China principle in international organizations is even more com-
plex. In reality, the equal status in cross-strait talks does not apply to asym-
metrical Beijing-Taipei relations in global politics. The divided state formula 
followed in domestic legal systems makes it diffi cult to circumvent the sov-
ereign state membership requirement in almost all UN agencies.61 The prime 
reason that Taiwan holds membership in 28 international organizations, mostly 
non-UN-affi liated, is that these organizations have “creative” membership re-
quirements.62 For instance, Taiwan joined the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) as an “economy,” the WTO as a “separate customs territory,” and 
the Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefi n Tuna as 
a “fi shing entity.” These various membership requirements bypass the one-
China obstacle and acknowledge the pragmatic need to incorporate Taiwan 
into international norms. However, the one-China issue will continue to incur 
renewed challenges to the state requirement in other organizations. 
In fact, Taiwan’s lack of representation in the UN system has posed a se-
curity threat to the international community. For instance, although the Taipei 
Flight Information Region covers 12 international fl ight routes, Taiwan has 
been unable to receive updated technical information from the International 
Civil Aviation Organization. This also had a devastating consequence in 2003, 
when the SARS outbreak left 73 dead in Taiwan, partially as a result of the 
absence of contact with the World Health Organization (WHO).63 
60 See, for example, The China Post May 9, 2008. In addition, since 2005, Taiwan has 
sought to join the P4 FTA between New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam. 
Despite the FTA’s “open-access” provision, the parties found it too “sensitive” to 
support Taiwan’s accession. APEC Forum, Progress of APEC Economic Integration 
and Taiwan’s Participation, PPT Slides, p. 11 (in Chinese). 
61 For instance, Article 4 of the UN Charter provides that UN membership is available 
“to all other peace-loving states.” Emphasis added.
62 Taiwan’s Memberships in International Inter-Governmental Organizations, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=32178&CtNode
=1442&mp=1 (last visited November 20, 2009).
63 Chronology of the SARS Outbreak, in: Taiwan Yearbook 2005, http://www7.www.
gov.tw/todaytw/2005/TWtaiwan/ch08/2-8-10-0.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (in 
Chinese). In addition, as a non-UN member, Taiwan is unable to join UN-sponsored 
treaties. Taiwan has followed the “unilateral compliance” approach with regard 
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To overcome these obstacles and to strengthen Taiwan’s international stand-
ing, the ROC has sought UN membership and asked the UN to review Resolu-
tion 2758 since 1993, but these applications were consistently blocked from 
being listed on the General Assembly’s agenda.64 Taiwan’s various efforts to 
join the WHO from 1997 also suffered the same result. These diplomatic de-
feats, to a large extent, have prompted an increase in public resentment toward 
China. The PRC was aware that Taiwan’s diplomatic frustrations are likely 
to lead to anti-China movements, which benefi t the pro-independence Dem-
ocratic Progress Party in election campaigns. To the PRC, dealing with the 
KMT, a familiar rival, is strategically safer than dealing with the DPP, an un-
predictable stranger. Hence, the KMT-CCP Party Talk in 2005 fi rst addressed 
the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international activities. Both sides agreed 
to negotiate relevant issues, with priority given to the WHO.65 In 2009, the 
WHO Secretariat issued an invitation to Taipei to attend the World Health As-
sembly, the WHO governing body, as an “observer.”66 The 62nd WHA As-
sembly, therefore, marks the fi rst offi cial UN-related activity that Taiwan has 
attended since it was ousted from the UN in 1971. 
Some may claim that Taiwan’s participation in the WHA signifi es a diplo-
matic breakthrough and that this formula should be followed with regard to 
other UN agencies. This assertion is an oversimplifi cation. It is true that, given 
the improved cross-strait relations, Taiwan’s efforts to join international organ-
to these treaties. For instance, in 2009, the Legislative Yuan ratifi ed the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which the ROC signed before it left the UN) 
and passed the Enforced Law concerning these two covenants. Through its diplo-
matic allies, Taiwan “deposited” the instruments of ratifi cation in the UN.
64 See, for example, Participation Proposal (2005) and Peace Proposal (2005), re-
printed in Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 23, pp. 104-
119 (2005). In 2009, Taiwan did not ask its allies to submit its UN accession pro-
posal. The government now focuses on “meaningful participation” in UN special 
agencies, including the World Meteorological Organization, the World Bank, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, International Maritime Organization and the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization.
65 See Point 4, Lien-Hu Meeting: Communiqué on April, 29, 2005, Liberty Times, 
available at http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2005/new/apr/30/today-fo3.htm. (in 
Chinese).
66 The invitation letter from Dr. Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General, states that “I 
wish to invite the Department of Health, Chinese Taipei, to attend the 62nd World 
Health Assembly as an observer.” This is the fi rst offi cial UN document that ad-
dresses Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei,” instead of “Taiwan, Province of China.” Lien-
Ho Bao, at A1 (April 30, 2009, in Chinese).
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izations have made certain progress. Nonetheless, these developments by no 
means untie the one-China legal knot. First, the WHA observer status does not 
directly touch upon the WHO’s state requirement. It should be noted that the 
WHA currently has six observers, including a sovereign state (the Holy See), a 
state-like entity (the Palestine Liberation Organization or PLO) and three inter-
national organizations. The composition of these observers leaves the Taiwan’s 
status ambiguous. Hence, either Beijing or Taipei may adopt its own favorable 
interpretation. In this regard, the domestic laws’ “one China, different interpre-
tations” approach is applied in the international context. However, not all UN 
agencies allow observers, and even those admitting observers may not have a 
similarly ambiguous composition. 
Secondly, it should be noted that, different from “permanent observer” sta-
tus in the UN General Assembly,67 WHA observer status is conditional on the 
WHO Secretariat’s annual invitation. In other words, Taiwan’s observer status 
may largely hinge on the development of cross-strait relations. Finally, the 
most important issue may be when and how the two sides will push the one-
China envelop. It may be accurate to state that, given China’s acquiescence, 
Taiwan’s “fl exible policy” has enlarged its international space. Yet, because 
of domestic pressure, the democratically elected government will continue to 
pursue its international claim. The real question is where China’s “red line” 
stands. To further accelerate cross-strait integration, the political issue of Tai-
wan’s status in the international arena is inevitable. The legal challenges im-
posed by the one-China principle that have evolved in the past few decades can 
only be overcome by the political wisdom of the two Chinas. 
5. Conclusion
The Taiwan question is the legacy of the “two Chinas” problem. UN Reso-
lution 2758 on “representation of China” does not halt the diplomatic battle 
between the PRC and the ROC. Rather, this resolution led to renewed legal 
challenges to the so-called one-China policy in both the cross-strait and inter-
national arenas. This article argues that the ROC’s state status was never extin-
guished as a result of derecognition. In past 60 years, the PRC and the ROC, 
which possess separate statehoods, have co-existed under the de jure roof of 
China. Facing the reality of divided state status, both Beijing and Taipei have 
gradually altered their once-rigid one-China policies. They both remanded the 
67 The Holy See and the PLO are also UN General Assembly’s “non-member state and 
entity” observers. Permanent Observers, see http://www.un.org/en/members/non-
members.shtml (last visited November 22, 2009).
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laws, paving the way for cross-strait negotiations. Foreign states have also rec-
ognized the divided China situation. This is demonstrated by the state practice 
that recognizes the PRC as the Chinese government, but declines to concede 
the PRC’s position on Taiwan. It is also evident in their treatment of Taiwan as 
though derecognition did not occur. 
Resumed cross-strait talks focusing on economic cooperation also demon-
strate both sides’ pragmatic approaches to the one-China principle. The in-
creasing warm-up of Beijing-Taipei ties largely accelerates the legalization 
of cross-strait integration and increases stability in East Asia. Taiwan also 
enlarges the scope of its substantive foreign relations. Despite these positive 
developments, the article fi nds it overconfi dent to conclude that the pragmatic 
approach to the one-China policy will resolve the Taiwan question. The future 
challenge remains as to how to accommodate Taiwan in UN-affi liated agencies 
under their state-only membership requirements. This challenge, albeit of a 
legal nature, will hinge upon the political development of cross-strait relations 
and will continue to be a core test for both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
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